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Implications of the Financial Crisis on 
EU Retail Banking  
 
The paper examines the possible implications of the ongoing crisis (2007-
2009) on EU retail banking business. After an explanation of the origins of 
the crisis, the paper compares the ongoing crisis with the Great Depression 
from the macro and microeconomic side by using stylized facts. Although 
the depth of the crisis was similar to the Great Depression, the quick and 
determined joint actions of the fiscal and monetary authorities in the world 
seem to prevent the same outcomes. From the microeconomic point of view, 
the crisis is very similar to the Great Depression, although this banking panic 
was “wholesale” in spite of the retail banking panic in the 30’s. As a conse-
quence of the crisis, the regulatory burden will increase, the paper evaluate 
the current regulatory suggestions and their business effects: increasing cap-
ital buffers, costs and lowering rates of returns. The short term strategic and 
operative implications show some kind of return to the core-banking busi-
ness. The medium term will impose some challenges to large international 
banks – these challenges will be organizational and activity based as well 
(funding). In the long run, big universal banks with good deposit gathering 
capabilities and efficient operations could be the winners of this period, par-
tially by moving East for the higher returns. 
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1. Overview of the financial crisis 
1.1. Origins 
The earliest signs of the crisis appeared in February 2007. The leading mort-
gage CDS ABX indices decreased relevantly, following the deterioration 
in the subprime loans. On the 27th of February 2007, the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) announced that it will no longer 
buy the most risky subprime mortgages and mortgage-related securities. The 
first SEC filing of a Chapter 11 was on April 2nd: the New Century Financial 
Corporation (a leading subprime mortgage lender) requested bankruptcy pro-
tection. Even if the situation was relatively stable until the summer of 
20071, the repeated rating downgrades (from June) launched the events 
which have led to the greatest global economic crisis after the Great De-
pression. But what were the causes? How could the bursting of the U.S. 
mortgage bubble almost blow away the world economy’s structure? 
The causes of the crisis are usually divided into two groups: macroeco-
nomic and the microeconomic2. We can say that the long-term macroeco-
nomic environment, and the necessary financial development, innovation 
and culture determined the microeconomic circumstances – so the so-called 
“prologue”3 is the evolution of the world economy over the previous 10 
to 15 years.  
Macroeconomic 
The two main macroeconomic causes are: the problems related to the 
global imbalances and the low-interest rate environment, especially in 
the U.S. Before the start of the crisis, in the period of the “Great Modera-
tion”4 (1993-2007), a period of relative tranquility. The economic environ-
ment was calm, fuelled by the savings of big Asian countries (China, Japan, 
Korea) and the oil exporting countries (sovereign wealth funds) – the “cred-
itor nations”. The phenomenon is also called a „Global Saving Glut”5. This 
wealth was flowing towards the most secure instruments, which were the 
government bonds of the western countries (especially the U.S. – the “debtor 
nations”), helping to keep long-term interest rates low. Thus we have creditor 
                                                          
1 BIS (2009) 
2 BIS (2009) 
3 Király–Nagy–Szabó (2008) 
4 Bean (2009) 
5 Bean (2009) 
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nations financing and supplying products to the debtor nations, which caused 
severe macroeconomic hardships (which showed up in severe imbalances) 
for the “debtors”, e.g., high current account deficit. At the same time, the 
creditors were accumulating foreign reserves mainly in US dollars.  
 
Source: Bean (2009) 
On the other hand, excessive liquidity helped to maintain the high consump-
tion/spending rate of the “debtor nations”, with relatively cheap loans. Since 
investors were always interested in higher returns, they started to go after 
yields („hunt for yield”6) – thus the investment patterns became more and 
more risk- and leverage-sensitive. The excessive and cheap liquidity pro-
vided by the financial system7 –in the form of low long-term interest rates, 
and the permanent need for higher yields were the prerequisites for the 
microeconomic side of the debate8 (creating the basis for the microeconomic 
imbalances).  
                                                          
6 Király–Nagy–Szabó (2008) 
7 Mizen (2009) 
8 Bordo (2008) 
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Source: Bean (2009) 
Liquidity index during the Great Moderation  
 
Source: Haldane (2009) 
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On the macroeconomic side it is useful to mention the debate in monetary 
policy of the U.S. over the past 10 years. In fact, a relevant part of the eco-
nomic community is blaming the Federal Reserve (FED9) for not acknowl-
edging the need for monetary tightening – this (together, with the problems 
of the current economic theory, e.g. the rational markets theory) might 
be even thought of as a microeconomic cause. 
Microeconomic 
This environment fuelled very strong growth in lending which was di-
rected towards debtors with poor credit quality.10 This eventually led to 
the emergence of the subprime crisis. The microeconomic causes11, 12 were:  
• the failure of the prevailing banking business model (originate-and-
distribute: OAD);  
• the inadequate risk management practices;  
• the wrong incentives (and corporate governance failures);  
• the flawed regulation (business and product) and inadequate supervi-
sion (included credit rating agencies); and  
• crisis management failures. 
The OAD model was the revolution in the banking industry during the ‘90s: 
it is put forth and blamed by many papers for the crisis nowadays (see Ap-
pendix 1), although in the pre-crisis years it was acclaimed by the profes-
sion for “distributing the risks” of the system. Indeed, it blurred the rela-
tionship between lender and borrower13. In reality the OAD model needed 
two vital pre-requisites: 1) the available and cheap liquidity for funding the 
system, especially the leverage and 2) the proper ratings (from Credit Rating 
Agencies, CRAs)) for the correct pricing of the instruments. When the con-
fidence in the ratings (and consequently, in the prices) and the liquidity 
disappeared, the system collapsed.14 
  
                                                          
9 Whalen (2008) 
10 Vértesy (2008a) 
11 BIS (2009) 
12 Bank of England (2009) 
13 Király–Nagy–Szabó (2008) 
14 FSA (2009) 
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Three concurrent crises (Oliver Wyman (2009)) 
 
Source: Oliver Wyman (2009) 
Measuring, pricing and monitoring the risk were performed using modern 
statistical tools, which were based on historical data. After the “Great Mod-
eration”, all the models were distorted, since these were not really 
“through-the-cycle” models, because nobody has seen the end of the cy-
cle. The models did not really handle the problem of the “tail events” and the 
normal distribution Value-At-Risk (furthermore not even the most modern 
tool available) was inadequate to measure the real risks15. The stress-tests 
were usually based on unsuitable assumptions, because the previous period 
                                                          
15 BIS (2009) 
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was unusually calm. These problems were known, but still not really in-
corporated (“underpriced”) in the economic capital calculations16. 
The new, complex instruments were hard to understand and install into the 
risk management systems. Moreover in the OAD model, the risk were 
sometimes somewhere other than were the risk managers thought – e.g. 
in the end the dispersion of the risk was not greater, but lower than the ex-
pected.  
The majority of the risk indeed, remained in the financial system17, be-
cause the investors of the OAD model were other financial service providers. 
This led to the creation of the “shadow banking system”18 (see Section 
1.3.), which was not transparent, hardly understandable (for management), 
not monitored, supervised or insured by the state authorities.  
Another problem was that the pricing was based on the CRA’s ratings, 
which underpriced the risks19, the reason why the downgrades in the sum-
mer of 2007 affected the whole system so seriously. The problem was par-
tially related to corporate governance issues, yet the risk management prac-
tices were also not adequately embedded into the corporate governance 
system.20  
The directors and senior managers not always and not really understood 
the practices and the implications of the results of the risk reports. Moreover, 
often, the risk officers did not have enough power to influence the decision 
makers. Thus the corporate strategies did not contain asset quality require-
ments. 
There were even some problems with the identification of the risks, because 
the systems were rooted on the basis of the infinitely available funding21 
(sources), without taking into consideration the liquidity risks. The coun-
terparty credit risk and the liquidity risk were underestimated: no bank ex-
pected the totally frozen inter-bank markets22. 
                                                          
16 HM Treasury (2009) 
17 BIS (2009) 
18 McCulley (2009) 
19 FSA (2009) 
20 HM Treasury (2009) 
21 FSA (2009) 
22 Buiter (2009) 
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All-in-all the risk management system overestimated the institutions’ 
ability to manage the risks and underestimated the capital required against 
the crisis23 – this was the path from the liquidity crisis to the solvency trou-
bles (liquidity problems due to leverage). 
The incentives were wrong from three sides: the customer, the investor, 
and management. The customers did not give much consideration to the 
financial health, the risks and products of the financial service providers. The 
combination of the need for consumption and the financial illiteracy and 
negligence was an important factor on the retail side of the crisis.  
On the other hand the corporate incentives systems were highly misplaced 
on short-term revenue and profits. The compensation and MBO systems 
were based on short term sales and profit, rather than on the long term 
business sustainability24 (funding etc.) and risks (asset quality). This 
stemmed from the expectations of the investment community as well.  
The asset managers and shareholders were searching for big short term 
yields, profits – thus the targets pushed the bank management in this direc-
tions, and the resulting competition was fierce. As we have seen above, the 
management was not interested in understanding the risk management prac-
tices (although there were several regulations, e.g. in Basel 2 for doing this). 
In the end, the system favored short-term risk taking, creating a pris-
oner’s dilemma between investors and management. 
The last but not least cause was the inadequate regulation, supervision and 
crisis management practice. There were many unregulated products and 
markets. At the product level the authorities, especially in the U.S. did not 
properly regulate the mortgage-broker companies (intermediaries) and the 
products (e.g. very high Loan-to-Value, with very low pre-requisites), de-
signed for the subprime customers (e.g. low or no income).  
The derivative and structured investment vehicle markets were, in many 
cases, unregulated an over-the-counter (OTC) based. The supervisors were 
not able to see the signs of deterioration25. 
Fair value accounting (mark-to-market accounting) has also been blamed 
for the crisis, because it is thought to have caused a cycle of falling asset 
priced and forced sales that endangers financial stability. Moreover because 
                                                          
23 Kane (2009) 
24 HM Treasury (2009) 
25 Buiter (2009) 
12 
 
of the immediate deterioration in the price of the asset, it shows-up immedi-
ately in the balance sheet, thus when the institution has to sell assets for 
decreasing the leverage it starts a vicious circle, weakening the price 
more than the level needed26. In a downturn, fair-value accounting forces 
all banks to recognise losses at the same time, impairing their capital and 
triggering fire-sales of assets, which in turn drives prices and valuations 
down even more. Under traditional accounting, losses hit the books far more 
slowly.  
One part of the regulatory and incentive problem-set involve the CRAs. The 
regulation and supervision of the CRAs should have been desirable27, 
since the ratings took into consideration both in the pricing of the structure 
products and in the risk management processes (e.g. Basel 2 mapping).  
Moreover the CRAs possessed an inherent conflict of interests of sorts, be-
cause they were simultaneously performed both the rating and the advi-
sory activity: that is they advised on how to structure the products of secu-
ritization in order to reach the best grades (issuer-payer model). There were 
serious mis-pricings on the market, and when CRAs realized it and 
started to downgrade the securities. This caused turbulences and largely 
undermined faith in the CRAs28. 
The capital buffers were low and the provisioning was static (as opposed 
to dynamic), which might be at the base of the pro-cyclical behavior of the 
banks29 (the Basel 2 capital agreement is blamed nowadays because of 
this, see at Appendix 2).  
The capital requirements for proprietary trading and the counterparty risk 
were too lax (not really incorporating the liquidity risk) and the supervision 
of the liquidity of the markets was not properly monitored and supervised 
(nor taken into consideration for the stress-test and contingency plans). The 
leverage ratios grew enormously30.  
                                                          
26 Geneva Report (2009) 
27 FSA (2009) 
28 Sy (2009) 
29 ECB (2008) 
30 BIS (2009) 
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There were many problems related to cross-border supervision: the flow of 
information was weak31, the efficiency of the cross border supervisory ac-
tions was poor, and the skills of the supervisors were not sufficient for the 
new environment (business model, products, markets).  
There was no regulation based on macro-prudential risks, although the 
authorities (e.g. central banks in their financial stability reports) were moni-
toring these issues, they were unable to warn the community early on.  
The economic models of the central banking and academic community were 
based on models which did not deal with the financial markets’ inefficiency 
and the liquidity issues32. The international financial system was unable 
to “blow the whistle” and locate the problem in a timely manner, and to 
find a coordinated solution. 
1.2. Timeline – a short CEE detour 
The timeline of the events is well-known, but it is worth distinguishing be-
tween the industrial and the emerging market countries. From a Western Eu-
ropean point of view we can say that these emerging markets refer to the 
CEE countries. The origins, course of the events, and – naturally – the im-
plications, could be very different across these two geographic areas. 
The origins of the in the industrial countries, were described above. The 
global imbalances, the business model, and the regulatory environment 
played a very relevant role – mixed with the product innovation and the “hunt 
for yield”. In the CEE countries, however, these macro and microeco-
nomic conditions were different33.  
The OAD model was not used, the level of product innovation was much 
lower (less sophisticated), and the global imbalances had only side-ef-
fects34. The common elements regarded the “hunt for yield” and the weak 
regulatory environment. During the crisis, those CEE countries which had 
already adapted the euro or were approaching to the Maastricht criteria 
                                                          
31 De Larosière Report (2009) 
32 Krugman (2009) 
33 Nowotny (2009) 
34 Urban (2008) 
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(Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia) reacted more similarly to the in-
dustrial countries.  
Stages of the crisis (BIS categorization) 
 
Source: BIS (2009) 
There were some countries (Baltic countries, Hungary, Romania) where the 
above mentioned elements (hunt for yield and weak regulatory environment) 
were combined with a loose fiscal policy and a restrictive monetary pol-
icy35. This caused a relatively big difference in the level of interest rates be-
tween the local currency and the foreign currency. These differences, com-
bined with increasing household consumption (partially caused by the fiscal 
policies) created an increased demand for the EUR and CHF lending activi-
ties of the banks of these countries. 
The problem arose when the currencies of these countries began depre-
ciating (thus increasing the monthly payments due by the customers), and 
                                                          
35 Nowotny (2009) and Vértesy (2008) 
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when the loose fiscal conditions had to come to an end. As a result, macro-
economic conditions started to deteriorate36 (rising unemployment, depre-
ciation of real wages, inflation etc.).  
Moreover with the traditional channels of funding dried up37, the local 
banks had to dramatically change not only their lending behavior, but 
their business model as well (a business model which was based on funding 
by the parent, rather than on deposit gathering by the specific institution).  
Now we seem to be at stage 5 of the crisis according to the timeline above, 
and a turning point seems to be on the way, although it is very hard to judge 
whether it will be upwards or downwards: whether the shape of the will 
take the form of a V, U or W, or maybe even an L. In terms of having a 
benchmark, this crisis is very often compared to others, but the clearest com-
parison exists between the current crisis and the Great Depression.  
1.3. Comparison with the Great Depression 
The reason for making the comparison between this crisis and the Great 
Depression is the customary one: to learn something from the faults of 
the past – and to do it better this time around38. As in the first section, we 
will try to separate the macro- and the microeconomic aspects of the crisis.  
Macroeconomic comparison 
If we compare the macroeconomic figures and the developments on the stock 
exchange, we notice that this crisis is as significant as severe as the Great 
Depression. (source of charts: Eichengreen, Barry - O’Rourke, Kevin H. 
(2009). 
The “size” of the crisis (in terms of decline in output and plunge in the stock 
exchange) is similar to that of the Great Depression, and may even have been 
more rapid in terms of its effects. We can see a rebound in last months 
(from spring 2009) – this might take the shape of a V or U shaped recov-
ery in the following ones.  
                                                          
36 Nowotny (2009) 
37 Urban (2008) 
38 Swartz (2009): 
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Industrial output (world)   World stock markets 
 
On the fiscal side, the stimulus began in a much early period - the volume 
of public spending has been much higher than it was during the begin-
ning of the Great Depression. The reason for this  difference is that during 
this crisis the governments declared a solid and determined response, in order 
to rescue the financial system, and prepare some sort of “soft landing”. On 
the monetary side, it is useful to look at the evolution of the central bank 
discount rates, and the volumes of  money supply (source of the charts, 
again: Eichengreen - O’Rourke (2009)). 
Discount rates    Money supplies 
(7 countries)    (19 countries) 
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In the present crisis the interest rates were cut much more rapidly39, and 
the overall level of the rates was much lower as well. As in the case of the 
Great Depression, there is a similar 5-month lag between the beginning of 
the crisis and the monetary response40: this might be the process of recog-
nition. 
The rapid rate cuts are significant – the response was quick and determined. 
The money-supply chart shows the biggest difference between the two crisis 
periods: it is largely connected to the discount rate chart. The money supply 
had been boosted very quickly by the central banks who started to pour 
liquidity into the system, in order to stem the potentially grave conse-
quences41. The strategy of the authorities was to defend the system in a very 
solid way. 
Microeconomic comparison  
In the terms of the microeconomic side of the events, this banking crisis is 
very similar to that of the ‘30s. The major difference is that while the ori-
gins of the earlier one was a “retail” banking crisis, the present one is a 
“wholesale” banking crisis. The relevance of this comparison regards the 
possible regulatory responses: what do the regulators have to do in order to 
1) smooth the effects of the crisis and 2) avoid these type of panics in the 
future. 
One similarity is that both crises were affected by a real estate shock – and 
in particular, with declining housing prices (in the U.S.). In both cases, the 
banks became insolvent, and the ensuing process started with problems re-
lated to liquidity.  
During the Great Depression, depositors withdrew their bank deposits, be-
cause: 1) they feared a depression and wanted to smooth their own li-
quidity and 2) they were uncertain about the risks of their banks42. Un-
fortunately, these actions inherently weakened the system – resulting in a 
crisis of confidence which destabilized the system. The banks stopped the 
deposit conversion: thus asset prices did not fall because of any fire sales, 
                                                          
39 Fernández de Córdoba – Kehoe (2009) 
40 Eichengreen - O’Rourke (2009) 
41 Krugman (2009) 
42 Gorton (2009) 
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although there were a lack of vehicles of monetary transaction – since the 
cash is gathered and held by the depositors. The regulatory solutions included 
the clearing houses (along with the issuance of loan certificates rather than 
cash), and the deposit insurance system43 (to ease the fear of customers – 
and to handle the psychological aspect). 
The current crisis was rooted in the prevailing business model, which was 
based on wholesale funding (through interbank lending, collateralized by 
the products of securitization and through repos). The “depositors” of this era 
were the interbank market counterparties’ partners. The causes were: 1) the 
desire to maintain their own liquidity (fear of the crisis) and 2) the un-
certainty of the counterparties (risks of the partner financial service pro-
vider). Therefore, the reasons are exactly the same, only the method and 
the volumes are different. The method of “withdrawing” the money 
from the repo market is through an increase in the haircuts (a haircut 
determines the size of the collateral in the repo-transactions). 
2009: Wholesale banking panic on chart: average repo hair-
cut on a structured debt 
 
Source: Gorton (2009) 
                                                          
43 Gorton (2009) 
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In the current case, asset prices fell, because the convertibility was not sus-
pended (mark-to-market convertibility), thus institutions tried to sell loans 
and mortgages (with very limited success). The shortage of collateral and 
vehicles of monetary transaction is also very similar between the two crisis. 
The system which we described above is also called a “shadow banking 
system”44 because it could be performed not exclusively by regulated en-
tities (or at least non-bank entities), and a certain part of the activities 
were outside the scope of the regulatory authorities’ duties. This is why 
one argument proposed by the new regulatory process is to ‘tighten the sad-
dle’ on these companies as well (regulate these entities, and impose heavy 
limits on their securitization activities). Other answers (similarly to the ‘30s) 
could be to insure the senior tranches of securitization (like the central 
deposit insurance)45. 
It is clear that regulation will play a much more important role in the future; 
indeed the future landscape of the financial industry is partially based on this. 
The rapid and solid actions of the authorities will have their price: 
stronger state-control, heavier regulation, and more powerful regula-
tory authorities, at least in the short run46. In the following section we 
examine the possible future avenues for regulation. 
  
                                                          
44 McCulley (2009) 
45 Gorton (2009) 
46 FSA (2009) 
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2. Regulatory suggestions and policy re-
sponses to the Crisis  
2.1. Worldwide regulatory suggestions  
In this section we try to process and summarize the relevant regulatory 
advices which emerged around the world, during the crisis. There are a 
massive amount of economists, policy makers and even politicians who were 
preparing their own agenda for changing the financial regulation, the later 
which was partially blamed for the crisis. 
The most relevant regulatory initiatives include the: 
• “Turner review” (UK, FSA)47;  
• de Larosière report (EU Commission)48;  
• Financial Regulatory Reform (aka White paper by the US Treas-
ury49);  
• reports and advices by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision 
(BCBS)  
• reports of the Financial Stability Forum, later known as the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB)50;  
• Geneva Report51; and the  
• G30 Review52.  
These reports were prepared by various experts, policy makers, aca-
demic professors with the best efforts to enhance the financial stability 
and to avoid similar crises in the future. We try to compare and cumulate 
the different regulatory suggestions regarding the current topic, therefore the 
order of this section will follow the areas of regulation emerged. The syn-
thesis is not comprehensive, we outline the key points of the suggestions 
(those that could have the greatest possible effects). 
 
                                                          
47 Published by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) of the United Kingdom, on 18 
March 2009  
48 Published by the European Commission on 25 February 2009 
49 Presented to the Congress of the United States by President Obama on 17 June 2009 
50 Issued by the Financal Stability Forum on 7 April 2009 
51 Final version on 2 July 2009 by the International Center for Monetary and Banking 
Studies (ICMB) and the Center of Economic Policy Research (CEPR) 
52 Released by the „Group of Thirty” on 5 January 2009 
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Capital requirements 
Each of the papers contain the need to increase of the minimum capital 
requirements, and the introduction of some stricter rules: the basis is an in-
crease for the Tier 1 ratio, but even refers to the entire solvency capital. There 
will be a need for stricter risk modeling in particular by rethinking the VAR 
regime, the risk evaluation and analysis. Beyond this general view, there are 
some specific requirements, like a major increase in the trading capital re-
quirements or different capital charges for the complex products and event 
risk (tail risk).  
There is even one suggestion even for a specific capital charge for the “too-
big-to-fail” (TBTF) institutes. This suggestion refers not only to the TBTF, 
but also to the “interconnectedness” principle, because if a bank is very 
“embedded”, interconnected in the financial system, that could cause a 
systemic risk (in case of bankruptcy). Thus, the regulation should be 
stricter for these institutions than for the smaller, less interconnected ones. 
The changes are not limited to the capital charges only – they could even 
involve the uses of taxes.  
Another important area for regulatory changes pertain to the so-called 
“counter-cyclical” capital buffer (and risk evaluation horizons). This refers 
to the fact that during times of asset-price booms the banks should hold more 
capital, whereas in a market downturn the banks could hold less capital im-
plying lower charges. This is problem partially emerged in the case of the 
Basel 2 capital requirements (See Appendix 2). 
A concrete experience of counter-cyclical prudential regulation comes 
from Spain, where the banking sector emerged much more resilient than in 
the other EU countries53 (e.g. no governmental bail-outs) This is attributed 
to their “dynamic provisioning” system, although it is more like an account-
ing issue of prudential regulation. Similar to dynamic provisioning, capital 
regulation can also be counter-cyclical, which might be a solution to 
some of the problems of the post-crisis real economy effects (procyclical 
behavior of banks, restrictive lending – another potential vicious circle 
element). 
  
                                                          
53 FSA (2009) and HM Treasury (2009) 
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Liquidity standards 
A very relevant part of the crisis stemmed from the lack of global liquidity54, 
and the system-wide shortage of trust and monetary transaction vehi-
cles55. This was the first time that the regulators faced the problem of liquid-
ity risk being an issue of financial stability, a problem surfacing from the 
system, not only from the individual participants. This question leads us to 
the issue of the macro-prudential supervisory authorities, although firstly 
there are many issues pertaining to liquidity risk.  
The regulatory and academic analyses viewed the financial stability issues 
from the market and credit risk point of view – the operational risk was a 
“new invention” of the Basel 2 regulation (because of rouge trader and cor-
porate governance scandals of the 2000s). The whole foundation of secu-
ritization and the OAD model was that it helps to allocate the risks in 
the system better, and smoothes liquidity56. The professionals did not 
count on a possible drying up of the entire wholesale funding market. After 
the onset of the crisis and the associated problems, the question of proper 
liquidity risk regulation has become very important – and refers not only to 
the limit of the maturity mismatches, but also to some regulatory capital, held 
against them (the unexpected losses). 
All of the proposed suggestions call for some degree of liquidity cushions 
and/or tighter norms for liquidity management and prudential oversight – in 
other words, some kind of liquidity adequacy rules. Another relevant element 
would be an increased information disclosure.  
The third important aspect would be the enhanced stress-tests performed by 
regulators. As we have seen this summer, these stress-tests (or some kind of 
similar stress-tests) were done by most of the EU regulators57. The previous 
stress-tests were basically for the market risk evaluation and later for the 
credit risks. In the future the liquidity stress-tests and scenarios, carried 
out by the supervisors (whereas previously it was done by the banks) will 
play a more important role. 
Shadow banking system 
In section 1.3. we described the so-called shadow banking system. These 
are the entities (e.g. hedge funds, private funds) which were not under the 
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stricter banking regulations, but still were able to conduct activities that were 
very close to banking, like the repo-business (wholesale, interbank lending), 
and through the securitization. Their relatively unregulated status, combined 
with the high leverage and the interconnectedness, made them very risky. 
There is big pressure on regulators to put order within the net of financial 
service providers.  
A first issue, of course, is to put these institutions under the umbrella of 
the banking rules, or some rules which may be similar to these. There is 
some difference in opinions: while the FSA does not want to regulate them 
further58, the EU wants to regulate only the systematically important 
ones59 and the US Treasury would prefer to only register them60. The UK 
simply wants to give greater power to the supervisory body (the report was 
prepared by the FSA), and to define the bodies according to the real activities 
they perform, not by their legal form. 
The second issue is the question of the off-balance sheet instruments. These 
instruments and agreements (e.g. guarantees) are sometimes connected with 
securitization and regulatory capital arbitrage. Institutions were able to lower 
the capital requirements using these techniques, even if the risk remained 
there with certain of these instruments (e.g. credit enhancement facili-
ties)61.The Basel 2 regulation has already tried to tackle this issue, but the 
regulators now want to go even further by improving the transparency of 
these items with increased disclosure and accounting requirements, by taking 
into consideration the real allocation of exposures. 
Credit rating agencies 
As we have written above, the CRAs were blamed widely for their role in the 
crisis, so it is not surprising that all of the proposed suggestions contain some 
points regarding them. Firstly, increased supervision and registration, not 
only at a national, but at an international level of oversight. is needed from 
the authorities. The regulators, furthermore, would like to reduce the de-
pendence on ratings – this refers to the investment limits and even the cap-
ital requirements in the Basel 2 regulation (so that they have less role in the 
risk-weight calculations). They want to separate the rating and the advi-
sory activities of the CRAs (to avoid conflict of interests), and moreover, to 
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separate the bond and structure product ratings. In addition, increased dis-
closure and transparency is part of this package of advice, (e.g. regarding 
the procedures basically spelling out the business secrets). 
Securitization 
This set of rules is about the “code of conduct” of these shadow banking 
activities. The main suggestions are: i) to require the issuers to maintain a 
certain proportion of the securitized products, and/or ii) to relevantly in-
crease the capital charges on these products. They would like to decrease 
the relevance of the ratings (see above), and penalize the companies which 
are not conducting proper due diligence regarding the activity. Strengthened 
transparency and disclosure rules are also included into the new package of 
regulations. 
Credit-default swaps/OTC derivatives  
The issues of the CDS markets are related to the “shadow banking system”. 
As we have seen in section 1.3, the solutions of the post-Great Depression 
period were the clearing houses with the loan certificates (vehicle of mone-
tary transactions), and the deposit insurance system. Now the authorities 
want to set-up more centralized counterparties (clearing houses) for the 
CDSs, through which all the transactions will have to flow. Other suggestions 
include the development of trading infrastructure, and more transpar-
ency, increased record-keeping and speed of settlement.  
Remuneration 
The incentive system of the managers was a serious issue at the root of the 
crisis. There are many suggestions, on how to influence the system, although 
the topic is one of the toughest. The experts are relatively unified in the 
question of levels: the reform has to be not about the levels of remunerations, 
but the structure and the risk adjustments62.  
Thus, the banks need a much longer-term view on the remuneration sys-
tems which regardes the risks and rewards. The longer-term view might 
mean a full business cycle, or just a numerically set number like 3 or 5 
years63. The remuneration should be smoothed and risk-adjusted during 
this period. The regulators want to align the system with two important in-
terests: prudent risk management and the interests of the shareholders.  
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The compensation should reflect also to the risk horizons (and should be 
symmetric with respect to risk outcomes). Of course, the risk management 
staff should receive compensation independently of what they oversee, 
and they have to be given more relevance within the banking groups64. 
Corporate governance 
This topic is strongly connected with the previous one, but it is about the role 
of the risk management within the banks (which needs to be stronger), and 
the risk-understanding of the management (which needs to be better). The 
basic suggestions state that risk officers should hold high ranks in the cor-
porate hierarchy, with proper remuneration (independent from the over-
seen area) .  
Moreover stress testing and risk management need to be separated, inde-
pendent. Increased quality of risk disclosures is needed, and improved qual-
ity and time-commitment from the non-executive directors (UK) on these 
issues is encouraged .  
Deposit insurance schemes 
Although the deposit insurance schemes did not fail65 (there were no real 
retail bank-runs), the issue emerged, basically due to the fact that the system 
is fragmented throughout the EU, and the “burden sharing” is always a po-
litically sensitive regulation. In the case of Northern Rock, the co-insurance 
part of the UK scheme did not work66 (no holding effect), and the limit 
was ineffective: the system was subsequently changed (higher limit, no co-
insurance), but this was more a practical step rather than a systemic reform. 
So the EU and BCBS suggestions are to have a uniform scheme with com-
pulsory membership, basically pre-funded by the financial sector, and with 
government guarantees for further funds. This seems to be viable. The prob-
lems will emerge with possible future cross-border bankruptcies. 
Accounting 
The fair value accounting (EU: IAS 39, US: FASB 157) was also blamed as 
a source of the financial crisis as we saw section 1.3. The suggestions move 
to the direction of easing the pro-cyclical effects (fire sales, vicious circles) 
of the standards, and resolving the question of the complex products67. All of 
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the experts agree that greater international harmonization would be much 
better, but the differences between the US and the EU standards (partially 
stemming from theoretical points of view) are still very large, so it will not 
be easy to reach some kind of global standard. 
Crisis management 
This was the problem of the fragmented system of authorities in the EU, and 
even in the US to some extent68. The information sharing must improve and, 
there is need for a clear and transparent framework for crisis management. 
For the bail-out and lender of last resort (LoLR) issues, the system needs 
a “constructive ambiguity” in order to avoid moral hazard issues. In nut-
shell: what is needed is enhanced cross-border tools, international responses 
and information disclosures. 
Supervision issues 
The widest range of suggestions arose regarding this topic, especially 
since the supervisory systems are very different in the UK (HM Treasury, 
Bank of England, FSA), EU (European Central Bank, but basically a frag-
mented system of central banks and authorities, no common fiscal bail-out 
possibilities), and the US (federal system, authorities).  
The theoretical part of the newest discussion calls for macro-prudential su-
pervision. So far the authorities have overseen the individual entities and 
taken into account the effects of the macro-economic factors, but there was 
no supervisory authority for the systematic (macro-prudential) risks, for the 
actions of the system as a whole. The Financial Stability departments and the 
related reports tried to deal with the problem, but more or less without en-
forcement power (“muscle”). The only tool in the hands of the central 
banks was the LoLR.69 Now, because the crisis started from an individually 
rational set of behaviors, there is a need for creating a robust macro-pruden-
tial framework, and even with the authorities (or powers for the existing 
ones) to oversee it. 
The new macro-prudential regulation needs to be more principle-based 
than rule-based. The regulation for individual banks will change on two 
broad points: 1) the supervision of business activities of the individual firms 
will be supervised not only at the firm-level but regarding their the sys-
temic effects (e.g. exposures/GDP; asset cycles; reserves or liquidity ratios) 
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and 2) the product innovation will be controlled with respect to the full 
system (leverage, levels of risk taking, loan to value ratios etc.)70 
In the UK, this system is seen as part of the current “tripartite” one, by shar-
ing the responsibilities between the FSA and the BoE. In the EU the major 
issue relate to the cross border system of supervisors (national authorities, 
college of supervisors for cross-border firms) and the creation of a European 
Systemic Risk Council (a unified EU body for this). So there will be no 
additional responsibilities for the ECB, although the representatives of the 
ECB will be represented in the new bodies.  
In the US a Financial Services Oversight Council will be created for sys-
temic risk evaluation, and the FED will be given the power to regulate any 
financial firm and oversee the market infrastructure (in addition to emer-
gency lending). Moreover there will be a Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency to protect the consumers (a new body). There is an effort in place to 
try to harmonize the rules and supervision throughout the different states. 71 
For our purposes, the most important suggestions come from the de Lar-
osière Report and the possible actions of the EU Commission. Therefore, 
in the next section we try to explain in detail the possible novelties in this 
regard.   
2.1. EU policy response  
In the EU there have been four different types of responses72: 
• ECB actions (interest rates, liquidity, asset purchases); 
• domestic government stimulus packages (Germany, Spain, France 
etc.); 
• local financial responses (recapitalizations, bailouts, guarantees, 
toxic assets-handling, short-selling restrictions etc.); 
• EU regulatory policy response (e.g. de Larosière Report and changes 
to the regulation). 
The worldwide policy responses are elaborated in Appendix 3. In this 
section we concentrate on the regulatory actions, thus, we will focus on the 
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fourth point, EU regulatory policy response. We begin with the de Larosière 
Report. 
2.2.1. EU suggestions: the de Larosière Report 
The de Larosière Group had to recommend changes to the regulatory struc-
ture of financial services that would not require changes to the basic Treaties 
of the EU. Their approach to the questions have been “pragmatic”, and they 
have come up with practical solutions for possible financial services re-
form. The report is divided into two key areas – the regulation and the 
supervisory structure of the financial services sector. In this section we 
would like to concentrate on the “key aspects of regulation” (“Correcting 
regulatory weaknesses”). The issues on the supervisory structure were 
touched to a certain extent in the previous section.  
Basel 2 framework 
The report suggests a gradual increase in the minimum capital require-
ments; a reduction in the pro-cyclicality; the introduction of stricter rules 
for off-balance sheet items; and tightening of the norms on liquidity manage-
ment. 
It is absolutely essential t that the rules for bank’s internal control and risk 
management are strengthened, notably by reinforcing the "fit and proper" 
criteria (a principal which is based on eligibility rules for management mem-
bership) for management and board members. The report also encourages, in 
the EU, that a common definition of regulatory capital be adopted, clari-
fying whether, and if so which, hybrid instruments should be considered as 
tier 1 capital. This definition should be confirmed by the Basel Committee. 
Credit Rating Agencies 
As a future recommendation it was suggested that the CRAs are : registered 
and supervised. The CRAs' business model needs to be fundamentally re-
viewed. The rating and advisory activities should be separated. The use 
of ratings in financial regulations should be significantly reduced over time. 
The rating for structured products should be distinguished from the other 
products. Increased due diligence and judgment by investors and improved 
supervision is also needed. 
Accounting: the mark-to-market principle 
Accounting issues concerning complex products should be solved 
properly. The accounting standards should not bias business models, pro-
mote pro-cyclical behavior or discourage long-term investment. Thus the 
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standard setters (e.g. IASB) need to clarify and agree on a common, trans-
parent methodology for the valuation of assets in illiquid markets where 
mark-to-market cannot be applied. The standards setters have to open their 
standard-setting processes to the regulatory, supervisory and business com-
munities, and they have to strengthen their oversight and governance struc-
ture. 
Punishment: supervisory and sanctioning powers 
Competent authorities in the EU must have sufficient supervisory pow-
ers, including sanctions, to ensure the compliance of financial institutions 
with the applicable rules. The same authorities must have the power to retain 
these sanction regimes against all types of financial crimes. 
Shadow banking system and investment funds 
The EU needs to extend the regulation to all firms or entities conducting 
financial activities of a potentially systemic nature, even if they have no di-
rect dealings with the public at large. In all EU Member States and interna-
tionally there must be registration and information requirements on hedge 
fund managers concerning their strategies, methods and leverage, including 
their worldwide activities. There should be capital requirements on banks 
owning or operating a hedge fund or otherwise engaged in significant pro-
prietary trading.  
For the investment funds which are not part of the „shadow banking system”, 
the group proposes further EU wide common rules, notably concerning def-
initions, codification of assets and rules for delegation. This should be ac-
companied by tighter supervisory control over the independent role of 
depositories and custodians. 
Securitized products and derivatives market 
The EU needs to simplify and standardize over-the-counter derivatives; 
introduce and require the use of at least one well-capitalized central clear-
ing house for credit default swaps in the EU; and guarantee that issuers of 
securitized products retain a meaningful amount of the underlying risk 
(non-hedged) on their books for the life of the instrument 
Remuneration issues 
The Group declared that compensation incentives must be better aligned 
with shareholder interests and long-term firm-wide profitability by bas-
ing the structure of financial sector compensation schemes on the following 
principles: 
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• the assessment of bonuses should be set in a multi-year frame-
work, spreading bonus payments over the cycle; 
• the same principles should apply to proprietary traders and asset man-
agers; 
• bonuses should reflect actual performance and not be guaranteed 
in advance. 
Supervisors should oversee the suitability of financial institutions' compen-
sation policies, require changes where compensation policies encourage ex-
cessive risk-taking and, where necessary, impose additional capital require-
ments under pillar 2 of Basel 2 in case no adequate remedial action is being 
taken. 
Corporate governance: internal risk management 
The risk management function within financial institutions must be inde-
pendent and responsible for effective, independent stress testing. The 
senior risk officers should hold a very high rank in the company hierarchy, 
and internal risk assessment and proper due diligence must not be neglected 
by over-reliance on external ratings. 
Crisis management and resolution 
In the EU there are four issues regarding this topic: 
• moral hazard issues (see above: constructive ambiguity); 
• framework for dealing with distressed banks; 
• deposit guarantee schemes (pooled EU fund etc.); 
• burden sharing. 
With regard to crisis management, the group declared, that the EU needs a 
transparent and clear framework, the authorities need adequate tools, and the 
legal obstacles must be eliminated from the system. 
The deposit guarantee schemes need to be harmonized. Regarding bur-
den sharing, the group highlighted that there have to be more detailed and 
better harmonized rules than the current Memoranda of Understandings. 
2.2.2. Changes to EU financial regulation 
Some of the EU regulations are ongoing, so even during the course of work 
on the financial reforms, the legislative structure is at work. Here we try to 
outline the current changes. Some of the previously mentioned suggestions 
which will be realized in the near future. Some of the below mentioned 
regulations are the immediate consequences of the de Larosière Report. 
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Capital Requirements Directive 
This directive implements the rules of the Basel 2 agreement. On May 6, 
2009 the EU parliament passed the planned changes. They created an en-
hanced college of supervisors dealing with cross border institutions, with 
the call for a further legislative proposal on full EU supervisory integration. 
Liquidity management has been improved for banks operating in multiple 
EU countries; large exposure management became more strict, and a new 
large exposure regulation will be created by 2011. The securitized prod-
ucts acquired retaining requirements (5% of the total value) with the con-
sideration of raising it. The OTC products (most notably CDSs) will be reg-
ulated and a central clearing house for these products will be set-up. 
Credit Rating Agencies 
New rules will come into force from 2010. The credit rating agencies may 
no longer provide advisory services. The rating models, methodologies 
and assumptions will have to be disclosed. An annual transparency report 
will be required. An internal function of reviewing the quality of the ratings 
must be created. The new rules have even reformed the corporate governance 
of the CRAs (e.g. remuneration, independent directors). 
Alternative investment funds 
There is an ongoing proposal which mainly targets the hedge funds with more 
than 100 million euros of portfolio with leverage and above 500 million euros 
without the use of leverage. The directive will cover around 30% of hedge 
fund managers, and almost 90% of assets managed by EU domiciled 
funds. 
All the participants of the service chain (including depositaries and adminis-
trators) are subject to regulatory standards, with enhanced transparency. Cor-
porate governance, risk management, liquidity and conflicts of interest stand-
ards were reviewed. 
Deposit insurance 
By the end of 2010, the minimum level will increase from €20,000 to 
€100,000. The coverage will be around 90% of savings. No co-insurance is 
allowed until that minimum amount, and the payment period will be re-
duced to 3 days (from a current minimum level of 3-9 months).  
Credit default swaps 
There is an initiative (not legislative) to create a central platform, estab-
lished and regulated by the EU, with the participation of many global players. 
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Executive remuneration 
In April 2009, the EU adopted new guidelines (non-binding) for directors’ 
remuneration. It should be based on long term sustainability and value 
creation, include a deferred variable part, a maximum 2-years of severance 
pay, incorporate some conditions which allow non-paying in case of poor 
performance, and contain restrictions on share options for 3 years after the 
award. 
The EU also suggests greater shareholders’ control, “remuneration com-
mittees” for the companies, and obligatory voting on the remuneration issues 
for the shareholders, particularly for the institutional investors. 
Accounting 
 From 2008 there were many allowed switches (reclassifications) between 
the instruments held at the mark-to-market price and the amortized cost, ba-
sically because of practical reasons. In the summer of 2009 the IASB held a 
roundtable discussion regarding the off-balance sheet instruments: def-
initions etc., and there is currently an undergoing project focusing on the fair 
value accounting methods and recognizing and measuring financial instru-
ments.  
2.2. Possible future developments, trends of regula-
tory (Reform) evolution 
Since there are many initiatives presently on the table, it is hard to tell what 
the exact trend will be even in the medium-run. Regulation is moving in the 
direction of stricter rules – the shock from the crisis and the huge public 
spending for avoiding the consequences from the Great Depression will have 
its price in the form of much rigorous regulation. Although the European 
regulators might have thought in 2005 that the peak of the regulatory-cycle 
was in 2004, now it is clear that we are far from the end. Beyond the above 
mentioned suggestions, there are some further proposals which, at the 
moment ,seem to be a little exaggerated. However, in the future, should 
the crisis take a W-shape, these suggestions might easily become real leg-
islative ones. 
Single EU supervisor 
As we have seen in the previous section, there is a demand for a future single 
EU supervisor73. In the end, the issue is a political one: the smaller member 
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states are usually against this because it they fear that it might serve the in-
terests of the bigger, stronger member states with better lobbying power. 
However, it can be realized in the future and the supervisory system could be 
much more effective in the absence of coordination, information sharing and 
colleges. 
Narrow banking – investment banking 
This is an old-new proposal which emerged seriously in the UK this year, 
involving the separation of the two core activities. There is an enhanced 
version of this proposal, which includes a third kind of separation74: 1) public 
utility banking (similar to narrow banking: only deposits on the liability 
side, and with reserves, sovereign debt instruments and bank loans on the 
asset side); 2) centralized wholesale and securities payment, clearing and 
settlement platforms (regulated as public utilities); 3) investment banking 
(with all the other activities, and with the “shadow banking system”). This 
proposal would radically modify the entire banking model radically, by 
creating a totally new framework. 
Tobin-tax75 
This issue was emerged in August 2009 from Lord Turner, the leader of the 
FSA in the UK. He argued that that the financial system is too large and 
every transaction should be taxed because this is the only way to ensure 
their utility for society.  
It was instantly criticized by the banking profession and the policy makers 
because, according to economic theory taxes and other public interventions 
intended to correct distortions and other market failures should be targeted 
directly at the distortion or failure in question. In this case, the problem is 
that there is no distortions around the financial transactions. This tax would 
rather be a “punishment” on the financial community, used to curb its 
profit because of some kind of “social-unworthiness”. 
“Too big to fail is too big” 
This idea says that the real issue is not interconnectedness (of the financial 
institutions), nor their complexity or their internationalization, but 
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simply their size76. The other aspects matter (and they matter a lot) only if 
the size is too big: therefore size is the “conditio sine qua non”. Thus, the 
regulators have to somehow regulate the size, with implicit or explicit tools. 
The basic tool is competition policy – a very strict competition regulation 
(M&A rules, etc.), with an aggressive enforcement policy77.  
Another way to regulate the size aspect is through the tax size. This can 
even be done through the capital requirements78. The regulators have to 
simply diminish the “supervisory capture” situation, in which a “too big 
to fail” bank captures the supervisor, and the money of the tax-payers. It is 
much better for the economy if a bank cannot be allowed to get so big so that 
its potential bankruptcy can cause severe systemic effects.  
We are more or less sure, that if the crisis will be V or U-shaped, there will 
be no further changes then those already made. However,, as we men-
tioned above, in the case of a politically more serious turn or events, these 
additional recommendations might be possible.  
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3. Possible implications for the crisis on the 
banking industry 
3.1. The immediate effects of the crisis on the bank-
ing business – prompt changes in the strate-
gies and business models 
We think that the crisis’ effects on the operating and business model of the 
banking sector have influenced and will influence the banking sector in two 
ways. The first effects were the short-term ones, caused directly by the crisis. 
These changes in banking operations are commonly called “panic reac-
tions”. The second effects are longer and are much more difficult to predict 
with researchers usually setting-up some sort of scenarios for them. What is 
certain is that even the longer-term effects will be in “post-mortem” rela-
tionship with the crisis, so the path-dependency is undeniable. In this sec-
tion, we try to assess the changes in the short run. 
Immediate effects in general 
The banking environment changed dramatically compared to previous 
years with the shocks hitting the asset side of the balance sheets through the 
sub-prime and related assets, then hitting the liability side by: 1) drying up 
the liquidity; 2) making the capital scarce; and 3) increasing risks (write-offs 
etc.)79. The de-leveraging also had some effects. As a result of the weak 
stock market performance, the sector lost a great part of its capitaliza-
tion in 2008 (more than 50%)80, and although it gained it partially back, a 
significant amount of shareholders’ value which was destroyed. The sector 
received state-aid for recapitalization, and the cleaning of the balance 
sheets (toxic-assets etc.) – a partial nationalization. The effects of this 
were81:  
• dilution of the existing shareholders;  
• some kind of capital protectionism (less cross-border capital flows);  
• future cross border M&A activities (acquisition of the weakened 
companies or just by the possible re-nationalization);  
• an aggressive regulatory environment. 
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The first moves involved “repairing the balance sheet”82. This was ongoing 
by:  
• managing the ongoing write-offs (surviving);  
• raising capital (private or governmental) – increased Tier 1, de-
creased leverage ratio;  
• in the case of weaker institutions, search for mergers;  
• maintaining the level of liquidity (buffers; excessive provisioning, 
since the future losses were hardly predictable). 
A well criticized consequence is that some companies gained a lot of mar-
ket share from the state-aid and the recapitalization and have become 
even bigger83. Basically, the TBTF institutions have been made even bigger 
by the help of the taxpayers. We can say that these players captured the US 
government. The table below shows us how the three - currently - biggest 
banks of the US seized the retail market by taking over their competitors. The 
2009 data refer to after the Countrywide, Merrill Lynch (Bank of America); 
Wachovia (Wells Fargo); Bear Sterns and Washington Mutual (J.P. Morgan 
Chase) deals. An attention-grabbing element is that legally institutions could 
not be possess more than 10% of the deposit market, but in this case, they 
were permitted to surpass this threshold.  
  Residential Mortgages Bank Deposits 
Market shares June 
2007 
March 
2009 
June 
2007 
March 
2009 
Bank of America 13,80% 16,60% 9,60% 12,90% 
Fargo Wells 6,10% 14,30% 4,40% 11,00% 
J.P. Morgan 
Chase 
6,00% 10,90% 7,00% 10,00% 
Sum 25,90% 41,80% 21,00% 33,90% 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
Another immediate effect on the banking system was the huge decrease in 
the reputation and trust in the sector. The destruction of confidence hap-
pened on two levels. First was the loss of confidence between the institu-
tions, a factor for which wholesale financing vanished for a while. However, 
the more important effect was the diminishing of confidence in banks on 
the part of customers’, regulators’, and the investors’ side.  
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Since, in the short run, the demand’s elasticity is relatively low, it has 
consequences in the long run: the regulatory activities became more in-
tense; the customers’ and investors’ scrutiny increased84. So in the future 
it is very important for the banks to concentrate on regaining this public con-
fidence and prestige. With regards to the remuneration issues, at some banks 
there are already changes: last year bonus retention was wide-spread, and 
some changes in the MBO (management by objectives) systems were 
started85.  
Retail-strategies, operations 
The banks re-oriented their retail-strategies towards core competencies 
that prioritize client businesses over proprietary trading activities. This basi-
cally means some kind of “back to basics”. The lending activities slowed 
down and lending standards tightened until the end of 200886 An ease 
began to appear towards the middle of the year 2009 and while the tightening 
continued, lost its speed. We should recognize that these moves were also the 
consequences of a slightly changing customer behavior (growing savings 
rates; a struggling real estate market). Where (legally) possible, the loan 
agreements were modified regarding the changed circumstances, and some 
repricing occurred in terms of as well as obtaining new and additional collat-
eral.87 In sum, the risk-taking decreased and the prices went up. 
Changes in demand for loans to households (2009 Q2 ECB) 
 
Source: ECB (2009) 
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The second main move was to re-orientate focus from wholesale funding 
(since the markets dried up) to the core sources: deposit gathering. The 
tenor of funding increased from the shorter-term wholesale markets to the 
longer-term “sticky” deposits. The securitization processes – naturally – 
were diminishing. The reliance on central bank funding and repurchase 
agreements has also grown88.  
Other elements of the strategic change included:  
• cost-cutting (which should have been rather “efficiency increas-
ing”89, but in the panic period it was not like that);  
• more severe risk management practices (quality focus);  
• strengthening the work-out activities;  
• boosting non-interest income (since the levels of rates were histori-
cally at a low level, and the margins were under high pressure because 
of the increased cost of funding and risk)90;  
• improving the activities of the sales force (retaining and cross-selling; 
but also acquisitions). 
In terms of operations91, these moves also meant  
• higher staff turnover (cost cuttings also meant head-count reduction, 
or cutting and the elimination of some privileges);  
• some organizational restructuring, especially for the players very ac-
tive internationally;  
• suspended or restricted IT spending (one of the easiest method for 
decreasing the costs).  
As for the sales channels, they turned back on the traditional relation-
ships, and increased the branch activities, partially because the branch 
is the most effective deposit-gathering entity. The international, cross-bor-
der activities stopped for a while – there was a concentration on the domestic 
markets. 
In conclusion, we can say, that it seems that the sector avoided the same 
struggles it experienced during the Great Depression. The funding sources 
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started to flow again, the stock markets recovered for a while, and the retail 
demand started to grow, even the mortgage market (2009 Q2)92.  
It is important to highlight that this would never had happened without the 
concentrated, immediate and solid help of the governments. The flip-side 
is that this assistance will have its price when the re-privatizations start and 
- of course - in the form of a greater scrutiny, supervising and regulations. 
The regulatory processes are ongoing, and in the medium-term they will 
also have effects on the market. In the next section, we examine the ef-
fects of the changing regulations.  
3.2. Regulatory implications on the banking busi-
ness (effects of regulation) 
As we have written above, the regulation of the sector became much more 
forceful with political and professional pressure on the governments. 
The big question regarding the final solution is still whether the crisis will be 
U, V-shaped or W-shaped, because the regulation is the question of the po-
litical voluntarism as well.  
In the first case (U or V) there will be no “revolutionary” changes. In the 
case of a W-shape, the banking business model might dramatically 
change (refer to the narrow- or utility banking theory(reference)). In any 
case, the effects of the ongoing and possible future regulations are relevant 
for the industry.. In the following section we try to draw together the potential 
business consequences of the so far known regulatory suggestions. The order 
and topics are from the de Larosière Report (given that we are trying to draw 
some consequences for the EU retail banking business). 
Basel 2 framework 
The increase in the capital requirements and the possible counter-cyclical 
measures can cause price effects because the cost of capital will rise. At 
the same time (opportunity cost of capital) the returns on capital will be 
smaller (higher capital ratios), and smoother (through the cycle in case of the 
counter-cyclical measures). These changes could effect the expansion of 
the sector (lower leverage ratios), and can increase the asset-quality.  
Although the cause of the crisis was not the lack of capital – and it is ques-
tionable if these rules could prevent a similar turbulence - they are boosting 
the shock absorbing ability of the banks (which is inherently good). The 
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stricter rules for the off-balance sheet items will block the capital arbitrage 
opportunities of the institutions in the future. The tighter liquidity norms 
will tighten the credit maturity transformation process. These will have 
the same effects on the activities, as has been explained above. 
Credit Rating Agencies 
The CRA rules will strengthen the trust in the system but will have no direct 
business effect – maybe with greater trust, the pricing will become more 
reliable again, and the volume of some transactions (securitization etc.) will 
grow. 
Accounting: the mark-to-market principle 
The role of the fair-value accounting (or the role of the IAS 39) has very 
questionable in this crisis. Many discussions have revolved around it and the 
IASB has even written a document defending themselves against the 
charges. The amortized historical price accounting, in most cases, is simply 
further from reality than the FVA. Thus, in the future the accounting rules 
will be fine tuned, but the FVA will remain: the only possible direct busi-
ness effect of this might be the avoidance of fire sale in an analogous case. 
Punishment: supervisory and sanctioning powers 
The strengthening of the watchdogs will cause higher regulatory burdens 
for the banks. The compliance and risk departments will grow with more 
sophisticated technical requirements as well, and the penalty fees will be 
much bigger. These mean basically higher costs, which (depending on the 
banks’ ability to transfer the price) might mean price increases (volume 
decrease) and/or profit and return decreases. 
Shadow banking system and investment funds 
The regulation of both the shadow banking system and investment funds is a 
very important, systemic step, which will have no immediate business effect. 
However, in the long run, it will reduce the role of wholesale lending (by 
making it more expensive and regulated), so the business model effect of this 
points towards more importance on deposit gathering, and improved cus-
tomer relations. 
Securitized products and derivatives market 
This is also a very important area for regulation, and will make the system 
safer and more stable. The product standardization and the central clearing 
house (maybe the ECB) might be difficult to create, but for the safety of the 
transactions, it is both inevitable and useful. It might also boost the liquid-
ity of the markets in the long run – easing the cost of short-term funding. 
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Corporate governance: remuneration issues, internal risk management 
In the fortunate case (if the incentive system is well-designed), these corpo-
rate governance issues will have major effects on the banks, the management, 
and the shareholders as well. The managers will put greater emphasize on 
three elements:  
• asset quality;  
• business sustainability (customer care); and  
• efficiency (this is not a new element, but important).  
The efficiency aspect has always been important, obviously, but with the 
better understanding of risks, and the greater role of the risk functions 
in the organization, the asset quality priorities can strengthen. As can the 
long-term business sustainability, which is based on the customer relations 
and care.  
These issues will be more important even for the investor side of the sys-
tem, replacing the stress on short-term profitability. The shareholders, 
even the institutional ones, will be more interested in the “remuneration com-
mittees”. The business effects of the above elements will make the pure sales 
activities (short-term volume targets) less important: it will be ever-present, 
but the focus will be on the three above-mentioned points.  
Crisis management and resolution, DGS systems 
Until there will be no single regulation for these issues in the EU, it will 
be a cause for increased costs (like the fees of the pay-boxes), and con-
cerns about burden sharing. The psychological consequences of the mini-
mum increase on deposit insurance might be in the avoidance of bank runs, 
but since there was no real retail bank run (except for the case of Northern 
Rock, which was something like that), it is rather theoretical.  
The crisis management rules could moderate the risk appetite theoretically, 
but in practice they will have no real effect, since the rules of the bail-outs 
are always political in reality – so the moral hazard is not avoidable, we 
can only make it less attractive93. 
In conclusion about the regulation 
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These regulatory responses have been proposed in order to make the 
system more resilient, but they also put great burden on it as well (in ad-
dition to the risk of over-regulation). In general, the broad consequences of 
these new directives will be:  
• larger capital buffers (lower returns on equity);  
• higher costs – greater need for efficiency;  
• a shift towards simpler products (instead of the previous, very com-
plex ones);  
• changes in funding (wholesale funding will be available, but slightly 
more expensive);  
• shift in the business models towards the long-term business sustaina-
bility and asset quality goals instead of volumes.  
Of course all-in-all these steps points towards more a traditional busi-
ness model and lower growth and profit rates: On the other hand, this 
regulation will help to retain the confidence in the system and maintain 
stability. 
3.3. Possible implications for the retail banking 
business: an assessment 
It is not easy to predict t what will happen in the long-run in the retail banking 
business. The development is always path-dependent, so the already 
mentioned “post-mortem” connection between the crisis and the banking 
of the future will remain. What might happen in the medium- and long-run? 
Medium-run 
In the medium-run, one of the key strategic issues for universal banks will be 
whether to maintain scale or to break up94. Before the crisis, universal 
banks were trying to find greater synergies between business lines to justify 
the complexity of their conglomerate structures. Unfortunately, there is no 
clear evidence that the potential positive effects of universality (e.g. ad-
ditional cross-selling opportunities, revenue diversification, shared services) 
out-weight the costs95 (management distractions, coordination costs, misa-
lignment of purpose, potential inefficiencies of shared services).  
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The big international banks will also face the question of how to govern such 
corporate size – so the banks which are present in many countries have 
to decide on an effective corporate organizational model, and there is no 
single recipe of this. During the crisis the hypothesis of Universal banking 
will be re-tested, but we think it will remain, partially because other incen-
tives lay behind the universality as well, such as the convergence toward 
monopolistic power, or to be TBTF, the above mention possibility to capture 
the regulators. The most important incentive will be the organizational 
framework, within which these banks will be able to do their business 
efficiently.  
In the medium-run, the concentration on banking basics will rule:  
• funding from deposits and central bank/government sources,  
• tight lending rules, lower LTVs, more collaterals;  
• branch-based approach with multichannel strategy;  
• focus on high quality assets;  
• seeking the opportunity of M&As. 
The potential medium run winners could be: the deposit-rich (funding rich) 
universal banks which can use the group synergies96. If a bank does not 
have such characteristics, it will be forced to refocus on its core value 
proposition very rapidly. 
Long run 
As for the future of the banking industry, after all of the must-dos, that is, 
after the balance sheet repairing and all the other duties for surviving, the 
banks will have to rethink their operations and develop strategies which 
will not only be sustainable in the long run, but will also help re-build the 
confidence in the public.  
In the long-run, the surviving banks will try to exploit their individual 
competitive advantages on the basis of two primary dimensions: 1) the 
geographic reach and the 2) the activities performed97. 
As for the activity side: client revenues remained relatively strong through 
the crisis – thus banks changed their orientation towards client-oriented busi-
nesses over principal risk-taking. The attractiveness of retail and high net 
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worth clients98 (affluent and private banking customers) has increased as 
deposits have grown in strategic importance with two effects: 1) banks that 
have long-established organic roots in retail have recommitted to these and 
2) banks that have traditionally been weaker in this area have had a renewed 
motivation to gather retail deposits.  
7Cs for success in the new eco-system, regarding Oliver Wy-
man (2009) 
 
In the foreseeable future, the price of capital will be higher because of the 
above mentioned factors (scarcity, regulation), so there will be a signifi-
cantly lower profit-environment, at least in the western countries. Since 
the return on capital will be lower (and even now it is much lower than in the 
emerging market countries), there will be pressure to move deeper into the 
emerging markets. In these markets (e.g. the CEE ), the depth of the banking 
market is still not comparable with the western countries, and the physical 
presence (branch coverage) is also much sparser.  
Meanwhile in the developed countries the efficiency-arguments will be 
stronger within the network issues (eliminate or open) – there is still much 
room for expansion in Eastern Europe. The lower returns should force the 
banks to increase their presence in these countries, which might produce 
greater returns on capital. On a more global perspective, the Far-East (e.g. 
China, India, Indonesia) is also an area for potential expansion, given the 
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large bunch of unbanked population, and although it is not easy to set-up 
and run branches there, this investment will pay its return in the long run. 
With regard to the new entrants on the market, since the relevant players are 
risk-averse, a new entrant with eligible capital (something what is not easy, 
but it is possible, for example, Tesco Inc. in the UK) can make a good entry 
into the retail market. Another possibility for entering the market through 
is the above mentioned M&As which will occur as a result of the weakened 
companies and the re-nationalization. 
Cost reduction will need to be not only a general “cost saving”, but an actual 
method of efficiency increasing – thus more than the consequence of the 
panic. The organizational structure will change regard the new needs 
(more complex funding, capital planning, Basel 2 risk units, changing other 
regulations, compliance areas, internal auditors) because the more complex 
tasks will need new people, especially in the area of risk management.  
As for the products, there is a discussion on the subject of selling “white 
products”99, that is, not only the product of the company, but of others as 
well’ for a fee. This has not been widely practiced recently, but in the future, 
with more flexible organizations, there should be greater potential. It is fea-
sible that at the EU level there will be more product-level regulations 
than before in order to protect the consumers and to make the EU mar-
ket more harmonized. 
The delivery channels will be mixed, especially with regard to the multi-
channel strategies of the modern banks, the speed, the greatly increased 
transparency, and the switch between banks will be extremely easy. The 
“re-invented” deposit gathering activity will boost the physical presence 
(branches, customer relations). The branches will be even smaller, there 
will be more electronic possibilities and contact centers100. That will make 
competition fierce, which will also contribute to the margin pressure. 
As for the customers, the most important issues concern:  
• the re-building of confidence which needs time (and it is very cru-
cial);  
• stronger financial consumers’ protection (more compliance needs);  
• the rebalancing of consumption-saving trade-off towards savings;  
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• the greater role of know-your-customer models and improved cus-
tomer care, because of the importance of customer retention. 
In summary, the big universal banks, with good deposit gathering capa-
bilities and efficient operations could be the winners of this period. If 
they are able to use their competitive advantage (funding), with an appro-
priate risk-appetite, they could defend not only their market share (the 
profit), but even slowly attack in the long run. Moreover, through M&As 
they could gain even more market share. We think that the profit-gen-
erating ability of the emerging markets will remain, and there will be a 
shift towards the Far-Eastern countries.  
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4. Conclusions 
We have seen how the crisis evolved and the responses to it. This current 
turbulence was a good impetus for the regulators and governments to cre-
ate some regulations, which were required even previous to this latest 
turmoil..The financial system has also taken many necessary step towards 
creating a more prudent banking system, although these steps were painful.  
In the future, the global coordination of financial oversight can be real, a 
very important step forward. The financial sector will be much more regu-
lated and supervised, but there is a chance for much greater resilience and 
stability. The price of these improvements are the higher costs and greater 
returns. 
After the short-run panic, the markets started to recover and the banks will 
have to adapt to the new market and regulatory circumstances. This 
means a focus on the core banking activities in the short run, and - in case 
of big international banks – an assessment of the efficiency of the organi-
zation. The basic cost-cutting strategies are not enough – the sector needs 
improved efficiency, especially after the introduction of the higher regula-
tory burden. 
There will be a strategic change in the activities (focus on deposit funding) 
and the geographical improvement will be still very important for the 
banks. Since the levels of returns will be significantly lower in the devel-
oped countries than in the CEE or the more Eastern countries, they will 
have to move there in search of profits. There will be some new entrants as 
well – the re-nationalization and the unavoidable market cleaning effects 
(bankruptcies and takeovers of the weakened institutions). 
In the end, the winners could be the banks which have sufficient own- fund-
ing base, combined with high efficiency and appropriate risk appetite. In 
retail terms, there is a need for more and deeper customer relations (con-
nectedness), better communication, and exploitation of the scale of a big 
organization. With the rebuilt confidence, the sector could flourish again, 
on a healthier base. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Originate-and-Distribute (OAD) Model 
 
Source: Király–Nagy–Szabó (2008) 
We can see the basic scheme of the OAD model in the figure above. In the 
lending block, the lenders are not necessarily banks but mortgage houses (fi-
nanced by banks). The service goes through the service intermediaries and at 
the end of the process, the assets land on the asset side of the banks.  
This is where the securitization side starts, where with using some agents 
and professional service providers (legal offices, administrators etc.), assets 
are removed from the balance sheet synthetically or with the so-called “true-
sales”, to make the SIVs bankruptcy remote. The ABS factory then “cut” the 
credit pools into risk tranches and repackage the risk by issuing securities. 
The pricing was dependent on the Credit Rating Agencies which caused se-
vere problems after the downgrading. 
In the investors block, the investors (according to their risk-appetite) buy the 
paper, and in case of losses, the “waterfall” model works to assume them: 
first the “equity” part, then the most junior tranches suffer the losses, until 
they are exhausted – and in the end the senior tranches. During the crisis, 
owners of the senior tranches were not struggling as much as the risk-seeking 
investors – e.g. pension funds. 
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The problems with the system were not only the mis-pricing, the leverage, 
and the total lack of knowledge about the underlying assets, but the fact that 
a better allocation of risk did result. The risk remained in the system and 
moreover sometimes within the same bank (in the case of when the originator 
guaranteed some credit lines to the SIVs for the safe operations). 
Appendix 2: Basel 2 issues 
In 1988, the first international accord on bank capital, known as Basel 1 —
for the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)—was adopted. It 
represented, at the time, a significant step forward. But its rules for setting 
capital requirements were very simple, and internationally active banks were 
eventually able to circumvent them.  
The main problem with Basel 1’s capital requirements was that they were, 
practically speaking, not sensitive to risk. A loan to a non-financial firm 
required 8 percent of capital, irrespective of the firm’s risk (e.g. its leverage, 
profits, solvency, and economic environment). This ran counter to the way 
banks managed their loan portfolios and economic capital (where far more 
sophisticated measures of risk were considered). In June 2004, BCBS pub-
lished a new framework for the capital requirements of credit institutions, 
known as Basel II, which was finally issued in June 2006. In brief, Basel 
II links capital requirements more tightly to the risks that banks incur and is 
thus a significant and necessary improvement over Basel I. The Basel 2 (the 
Capital Requirements Directive) was implemented only on 1 January 2008 
in the EU (in the US later, and only partially), so it could not be the cause of 
the crisis. One other question remains: did it worsen the crisis? 
The Basel 2 capital agreement was blamed for: 
• the insufficient average level of capital; 
• the severe losses it caused in combination with the Fair-Value Ac-
counting; 
• procyclicality : reinforcing business cycle fluctuations; 
• the assessment of credit risk delegated to the CRAs which created 
conflicts of interest; 
• inadequate internal models of banks for measuring risk exposures; 
• providing incentives to hide the very risky exposures from the bal-
ance sheet. 
Although these accusations have some foundations, and the Basel 2 system 
has got its flaws and weaknesses, the professional community found the 
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great majority of the accusations to be fallacies. Below we provide some 
details.  
The explanations are as follows101: 
1. Capital issues: the level of capital was basically unchanged from the pre-
vious accord because of regulatory reasons (step-by-step increase), but 
the issue was therewith Basel 1 as well. 
2. Fair Value Accounting (FVA): the FVA itself fostered the evolution of 
the crisis, but the combined effect with the Basel 2 was not really rele-
vant (it had its effect even with the previous accord). 
3. Procyclicality102: this is a valid argument and there are actions that can 
be taken for correcting it (see the counter-cyclical provisioning and/or 
capital requirements), but banking behaviour is inherently procyclical. 
Some of the experts say that in the Pillar 2, the pro-cyclic effects can be 
eased. 
4. CRA103: rightful accusation – and it is under amendment with the effect 
of diminishing the CRA’s conflicts of interest. 
5. Internal models – the criticism is that the regulators left too much 
(what?) to the banks. The supremacy of the inadequate internal models 
worsened the situation. In fact, the internal models were not perfect, but 
still there are no better alternatives, and forecasting will always suffer 
from faults. Moreover the internal models are not inherently accepted – 
the competent authorities must to play a relevant role in the validation 
and tests of the models. If the capital planning of the banks is not suffi-
cient, they can impose another amount of capital which has to be created. 
6.  Risky exposures: in Basel 1, there were more incentives for this activity 
and Basel 2 tried to eliminate this with partial success (obviously not 
totally). Thus the main responsibility lies with the previous prudential 
regime.104 
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In conclusion we can see that Basel 2 cannot be held accountable for the 
crisis and did not even cause a worsening of the circumstances. Indeed, 
it has its faults, the major issue is maybe the procyclicality, but that is why 
the regulators are trying to set-up counter-cyclical rules now. For the exag-
gerated use of the internal, mathematical models, we cannot blame the insti-
tutions since these are the most sophisticated methods available for measur-
ing risk. In particular, the especially “blamable” system is simply the pru-
dential system of the ‘9’s and the last decade. The philosophy of Basel 2: 
the risk sensitiveness, the important risk functions, the managerial im-
portance, the sophistication of the risk estimations will remain and 
strengthen, eventually correcting the gaps in the regulation. 
Appendix 3: Policy responses (Source: BIS (2009)) 
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